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A
fter stagnating for many years, the rate of
new bank formation has increased sharply
in the second half of the 1990s. The
financial press attributes this development to the
high volume of bank mergers, which are said to
have encouraged new entry by reducing service
to some bank customers. It is commonly asserted,
for example, that many new banks serve small
businesseswhosebanksweretakenoverbylarger
banksuninterestedinmakingsmallbusinessloans.
Most banking experts agree that such an increase
in new banks in response to mergers would be
healthy, helping maintain competition in local
banking markets and offset reductions in service.
The view that mergers encourage new bank
formationhasrecentlycomeintoquestion.Exam-
ining data on new bank charters and mergers in
the 1990s, a study released early last year con-
cluded that mergers have actually discouraged
new bank formation. Shortly thereafter, another
study came to the opposite conclusion, finding
that mergers encourage new entry. Economists
arefamousfordisagreeing,butitissurprisingthat
twostudiesexaminingthesameperiodcouldreach
such different conclusions on an important issue
of public policy.
Takentogether,thesestudiesraisetwoimpor-
tantquestions.First,ismergeractivitypositively
or negatively related to new bank formation?
Second,ifmergersarepositivelyrelatedtonew
bank formation, which types of mergers account
for the link? The mergers that could reasonably
be expected to encourage start-ups are those in
which small banks are taken over by large banks
or local banks are taken over by distant banks,
because such mergers can drive away small
businesses and other customers who value per-
sonal service. Thus, the more these mergers
account for the positive relationship between
merger activity and new bank formation, the
more confident we can be that the relationship
is not just a coincidence.
This article reexamines the relationship
between mergers and new bank charters, distin-
guishingmorecarefullythantheothertwostud-
ies between different types of mergers. The
results, based on data for the second half of the
1990s, provide strong support for the view that
mergersencouragetheformationofnewbanks.
Specifically, the article finds that markets with
more merger activity experienced higher rates
of new bank formation, and that the mergers
with the strongest link to new bank formation
were those in which small banks were taken
over by large banks or local banks by distant
banks.
William R. Keeton is a senior economist at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Michelle Holloway, a former
research associate at the bank, helped prepare the article.
This article is on the banks web site at www.kc.frb.org.The first section of the article describes how
the controversy over the relationship between
mergers and new bank formation arose. The sec-
ond section explains the economic arguments
behind the controversy, pointing out how merg-
ers could either encourage or discourage new
bank formation. The third section summarizes
and evaluates the two recent studies. The fourth
section looks at the relationship between new
bank formation and total merger activity in
roughly 300 urban markets from June 1995 to
June1999.Thefifthsectioninvestigateswhether
new bank formation depends on the form taken
by bank mergers.
I. HOW THE CONTROVERSY OVER
MERGERS AND NEW CHARTERS
AROSE
While economists have long been interested in
the determinants of new bank formation, they have
only recently become interested in the influence
of bank mergers on new charters. This interest
was first aroused in the second half of the 1990s
by the coincidence of high merger activity and
high rates of new bank formation. Interest in the
relationship between mergers and new bank
charters then intensified last year with the appear-
ance of two empirical studies employing similar
methods but reaching opposite conclusions.
Empiricalstudiesofnewbankformationbefore
the1990sdidnotfocusonthelinkbetweenmerg-
ers and start-ups (Amel and Liang; Hanweck;
Rose; Moore and Skelton). Instead, the studies
examined how entry to local markets depended
on factors such as recent rates of population and
incomegrowth,theprofitabilityofbanksoperat-
ing in the market, and the extent to which loans
and deposits were concentrated in a few banking
organizations. While differing in some of their
findings, the studies typically found that the rate
of new bank formation was higher in markets
with high bank profitability, high rates of popu-
lation and income growth, and lower levels of
market concentration.
The influence of bank mergers on new bank
formation began to attract attention in the sec-
ondhalfofthe1990s,whenajumpinnewbank
charters coincided with a continued rise in
merger activity. As shown in Chart 1, the num-
ber of new bank charters surged to almost 400
intheearly1980s,fellsteadilyoverthenextten
years, and then rebounded sharply in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s. While showing consid-
erable year-to-year volatility, merger activity
trended upward over the period, averaging
three times as much in the 1990s as the 1980s.
The fact that merger activity was high prior to
and during the rebound in new charters led
many banking analysts to claim that mergers
helped spark the rebound. This view was sup-
ported by numerous stories of new banks being
started to serve dissatisfied customers of merging
banks or to take advantage of merger-related
layoffs.
The view that mergers lead to more new bank
charters was not seriously questioned until the
appearance early last year of a new empirical
study on the issue (Seelig and Critchfield). The
study pointed out that the coincidence of heavy
mergeractivityandhighnewbankformationin
the second half of the 1990s did not prove that
mergersleadtomorenewbanks.Instead,merger
activity and new bank activity could both have
increased in response to other factors such as
high bank profits and strong economic growth.
Controlling for these other factors and examin-
ing data on mergers and new bank charters
across markets, the study concluded that merg-
ers actually discourage start-ups.
Adding to the controversy, a second study
appeared shortly afterward confirming the pop-
ular view that mergers lead to more new banks
(Berger and others). While differing from the
first study in many details, the second study
was similar in two key respectsit examined
data on mergers and new bank charters across
markets in the second half of the 1990s, and it
controlled for other factors that could have
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charters during that period. Despite these key
similarities, the second study reached the oppo-
site conclusion from the first, finding that merg-
ers encourage start-ups.
II. ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS BEHIND
THE CONTROVERSY
Which of the two studies is to be believed?
Thissectionpointsoutthatreasonableeconomic
arguments can be made for both sets of findings.
Consistent with the findings of Seelig and
Critchfield, mergers could discourage start-ups
by producing organizations with enough local
market power to deter entry. But consistent with
the findings of Berger and others, mergers could
also encourage start-ups by creating gaps in ser-
vice to small customers who put a premium on
personal service. Neither effect can be ruled
out, given the types of mergers that actually
occurred during the 1990s.
How mergers could lead to fewer
start-ups
The main way mergers could reduce new
bank formation, as found by Seelig and Critch-
field, is by increasing concentration in local
banking markets. Some mergers have no effect
onlocalmarketconcentrationbecausethecom-
bining organizations operate in completely
different geographic markets. Many mergers,
however, involve market overlapsome or all
of the markets in which the combining organi-
zationsoperatearethesame.Suchmergerstend
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Chart 1
MERGER ACTIVITY AND NEW BANK CHARTERS
Source: FDIC for new charters and Rhoades for merger activity (updates supplied by author).
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500to increase the concentration of local markets,
unless the organizations are required by regulators
to divest themselves of branches before merging.
Some analysts believe new banks are less likely
to be chartered in highly concentrated markets
because the dominant banking organizations in
such markets can act in ways that discourage
entry. For example, in a highly concentrated
market, potential entrepreneurs may refrain from
starting a new bank out of fear that the dominant
organizations will engage in cutthroat competi-
tiontodrivethemoutofbusiness. Notallanalysts
agreethathighconcentrationdetersentry,arguing
that the short-term losses dominant banks would
have to incur to drive out new entrants would be
too great for the threat of cutthroat competition to
be credible. As noted earlier, however, empirical
studies of new bank charters before the 1990s
generally found that highly concentrated markets
do experience lower rates of new entry (Amel
and Liang; Hanweck; Rose).
1
Could merger activity have increased con-
centration in some markets to the point that
entry was discouraged? For mergers to have
had such an effect in the 1990s, a substantial
fraction would have had to involve market over-
lap. Table 1 shows that mergers with market
overlap have indeed been important during the
1990s, although they account for well under
half of total merger activity during the period.
For the years 1993-99, the first column shows
theamountofdepositsacquiredinmergerswith
market overlap during each 12-month period
ending in June. The second column expresses
this amount as a percent of total bank deposits at
the beginning of the period, while the third col-
umn expresses the amount as a percent of total
deposits acquired in mergers. Mergers with mar-
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Table 1
DEPOSITS ACQUIRED IN MERGERS
Market overlap between merger participants
Year*
Deposits acquired
(billions of dollars) Percent of total deposits
Percent of all deposits
acquired in mergers
1993 37 1.6 37.8
1994 32 1.3 32.3
1995 35 1.5 43.8
1996 119 4.9 40.0
1997 39 1.5 42.0
1998 59 2.1 29.3
1999 50 1.7 13.6
Average 53 2.1 34.1
* For 12-month periods ending in June.
Note: Deposits are for domestic offices only. For each market and merger, the amount of acquired deposits with market
overlapisthelesseroftwoamountsthelocaldepositsoftheacquiredorganizationandthelocaldepositsoftheacquiring
organization.
Source: Summary of Deposits and Natural Information Center Database.ket overlap varied widely from year to year but
were substantial both in absolute and relative
terms over the period as a whole. Specifically, an
average of $53 billion in deposits was acquired in
mergerswithmarketoverlapeachyear,represent-
ing 2.1 percent of total deposits and 34.1 percent
of total merger activity.
While mergers with market overlap have been
important in the 1990s, it does not necessarily
follow that they increased concentration enough
to deter entry. Before approving a merger, bank
regulators consider the impact of the merger
on local market concentration. If the merger
would increase concentration above an estab-
lished threshold, either the merger is rejected or
the merging organizations are required to divest
some of their branches.
2 Some analysts argue
that such behavior by regulators has prevented
mergers with market overlap from increasing local
market concentration to the point that potential
entrants have to worry about cutthroat competi-
tion from dominant banking organizations.
How mergers could lead to more start-ups
The main way mergers could increase new
bankformation,asfoundbyBergerandothers,is
by driving customers away from acquired bank-
ing organizations. Mergers sometimes cause tem-
porary disruptions in service to customers due to
difficulties in combining the computer systems
or establishing new reporting relationships. Even
more important, mergers may cause a permanent
reduction in service to some customers because
theacquiringorganizationislesswillingorableto
servethosecustomersthanwastheacquiredorga-
nization. The more dissatisfied bank customers
become following a merger, the easier it is for
new banks operating in the same market to attract
enough business to make a profit.
Someanalystsassertthatthemergersmostlikely
to encourage new bank formation by reducing
service to some customers are those in which
small banking organizations become part of large
organizations or local banking organizations
become part of distant banking organizations.
Specifically, these analysts argue that mergers
in which ownership shifts away from small
organizations or toward distant organizations
tend to reduce services to small businesses and
other customers who value personalized ser-
vice. New banks are then tempted to enter the
market to serve these disaffected customers.
The most common argument in support of
this view is that large or geographically dis-
persed banking organizations have a disadvan-
tage in serving small businesses due to their
long lines of managerial control.
3 It is usually
not feasible for the top managers of a large or
geographically dispersed banking organization
to review every lending decision on small loans.
Asaresult,whenasmallbankingorganizationis
taken over by a large organization or a local
organization is acquired by a distant organization,
lending officers are usually given less autonomy
and required to follow more rigid rules in grant-
ing credit. This more rigid approach to small
business lending may result in the acquired
organizationmakingfewersmallbusinessloans,
allowingnewlycharteredbankstostepinandfill
the gap.
4
A related argument is that mergers in which
ownership shifts away from small organizations
ortowardlargeorganizationsreduceservicesto
depositors who want a personal relationship
withtheirbank.Accordingtothisview,largeor
geographically dispersed banking organizations
are uninterested in providing personalized ser-
vicetodepositors,preferringtocatertodepositors
who are comfortable conducting their business
byphone,computer,orATM.
5Thus,whenown-
ership shifts to a large or distant organization as
a result of a merger, depositors who put a pre-
mium on personalized service may become dis-
satisfied.Suchdissatisfactionamongdepositors
makes it easier for new banks to build up their
own deposit base, increasing the number of
entrepreneurs willing to start a bank.
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services to small, relationship-based customers
enough to increase the rate of new bank forma-
tion?Suchanoutcomewouldbemoreplausibleif
asignificantproportionofmergersshiftedowner-
ship away from small organizations or toward
distant organizations. Table 2 shows that mergers
of this kind were indeed important in the 1990s,
accounting for well over half of all merger activ-
ity.Thetablereportsthetotalamountofdeposits
acquired each year in two types of mergers: 1)
thoseinwhichownershipoflocaldepositsshifted
from an organization with less than $1 billion in
assets to an organization with more than $1 bil-
lion in assets, and 2) those in which ownership
of local deposits shifted to an out-of-market or
out-of-state organization. Such mergers varied
widely from year to year but were even more sub-
stantial than mergers involving market overlap
over the period as a whole. Specifically, an aver-
age of $112 billion in deposits was acquired
each year, representing 4.2 percent of total depos-
its and 66.3 percent of total merger activity.
III. CRITIQUE OF THE TWO STUDIES
The previous section showed that the dis-
agreement between the two recent studies on
mergers and new bank charters cannot be
resolved on the basis of economic arguments
alone.Anotherwaytoresolvethecontroversyis
to see if one study was clearly superior to the
other in the way it estimated the impact of
mergers on new bank charters. This section
argues that the second study had a number of
advantages over the first study, such as not
lumping bank mergers with thrift mergers and
measuring merger activity more carefully. The
section also points out, however, that the sec-
ond study had shortcomings of its own.
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Table 2
DEPOSITS ACQUIRED IN MERGERS
Shifts away from small organizations or toward distant organizations
Year*
Deposits acquired
(billions of dollars) Percent of total deposits
Percent of all deposits
acquired in mergers
1993 72 3.1 73.7
1994 66 2.8 67.9
1995 63 2.6 78.8
1996 113 4.6 38.2
1997 53 2.0 56.8
1998 156 5.7 78.3
1999 258 8.8 70.6
Average 112 4.2 66.3
*For 12-month periods ending in June.
Note:Depositsarefordomesticofficesonly.Shiftsawayfromsmallorganizationsareshiftsinownershipoflocaldeposits
from organizations with less than $1 billion in premerger assets to organizations with more than $1 billion in postmerger
assets(1998dollars).Shiftstowarddistantorganizationsareshiftsinownershipoflocaldepositsfromin-marketorganiza-
tions to out-of-market organizations or from in-state organizations to out-of-state organizations.
Source: Summary of Deposits, Reports of Income and Condition, and Natural Information Center Database.Seelig and Critchfield
The first study examined the relationship
between new charters and prior merger activity
in roughly 300 urban markets during the years
1995-97. Specifically, regression analysis was
used to determine if merger activity helped
explain why entry by banks or thrifts occurred in
some markets and years but not others. Merger
activity was measured by the number of locally
based banks and thrifts that had been absorbed
by other banks and thrifts in recent years. In the
analysis, the authors controlled for a variety of
other factors that could also affect entry. These
factors were similar to those considered in ear-
lier studies, such as recent population growth,
recent bank profitability, and the current level of
market concentration.
Themainfindingofthestudywasthatmergers
discourage start-ups. The effect of mergers on
the likelihood of entry was allowed to depend on
twofeaturesofthemerger.Thefirstwaswhether
the merging banks or thrifts belonged to the
same holding company (intra-holding company
consolidation). The second was whether the
acquiring bank or thrift was headquartered out-
side the market (out-of-market merger). The
study found that no type of merger increases the
likelihood of entry, and that out-of-market merg-
ers between banks in different holding compa-
nies actually decrease the likelihood of entry.
6
While this study marks an important advance
inresearchonnewbankformation,itcanbecrit-
icizedonthreegrounds. Thefirstproblemisthat
the study lumped thrifts together with banks. As
notedearlier,oneofthemainwaysbankmergers
can encourage new bank charters is by reducing
small business lending. Thrift mergers are
unlikely to have this effect on new thrift charters
because thrifts do little business lending of any
kind. Thus, lumping thrifts together with banks
may mask the tendency for bank mergers to
encourage start-ups by reducing services to
small businesses.
A second problem is the way the study mea-
sured merger activity. Because the merger mea-
sure was based on the number of mergers, it did
not take into account the size of the banks
involved. Furthermore, the measure excluded
two important types of mergerthose in which
the acquired bank was headquartered outside the
market and those in which the acquired bank
retained its charter. There is no obvious reason
why such mergers should not also affect new
bank formation, and thus, no reason to exclude
them from the measure of merger activity.
Finally,theauthorsofferednoexplanationfor
their finding that some mergers reduce the like-
lihood of entry. As suggested earlier, one way
mergersmightdiscourageentryisbyincreasing
local market concentration. However, only out-
of-market mergers were found to decrease the
likelihood of entry, and these mergers typically
have little or no effect on local market concen-
tration.
7 Furthermore, even if such mergers did
increase local market concentration, the effect
on entry should already be accounted for by the
control variables, one of which is concentration
during the year of entry.
Berger and others
The second study obtained opposite results
from the first study despite similarities in the
basic approach used, the period of time cov-
ered, and the set of markets included. As in the
first study, regression analysis was used to
determine if recent merger activity helped
explain the likelihood of entry, controlling for
other factors that could also influence the deci-
sion to start a bank. Alonger period of time was
covered, 1980-98, and both rural and urban
markets were included. However, the regres-
sion analysis was performed separately for
urbanmarketsduringtheyears1995-98,asam-
ple similar to the one used in the first study.
While similar in many respects, the second
study also differed from the first in two impor-
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thrifts together, the study focused on banks alone,
avoiding the problem that thrift mergers may
have very different effects on entry than bank
mergers. Second, the study used a superior
measure of local merger activity. Merger activ-
ity was measured not by the number of mergers
butbythedepositsofbanksinvolvedinmergers,
which has the advantage of taking into account
the size of merger participants. Moreover, the
merger measure included the two types of
mergers ignoredbythefirststudytakeoversof
banks based outside the market and mergers in
which banks changed holding companies but
kept their charters.
8
Themainfindingofthestudywasthatmergers
encourage start-ups. In the empirical analysis,
the impact of mergers on the likelihood of entry
wasallowedtodependononlyonefeatureofthe
mergerwhetherthebankacquiredinthemerger
kept its charter. The study found that mergers
increased the likelihood of entry in urban mar-
kets, whether or not the bank acquired in the
merger retained its charter. This result held both
for the entire period 1980-98 and for the more
recent period 1995-98.
9
Although improving upon the first study in
important ways, the study by Berger and others
can also be criticized on several grounds. One
problem is that the merger variable used in the
study may have overstated merger activity in
some markets. In those mergers in which one
bank was absorbed by another, the merger vari-
able included not only the deposits of the
acquired bank, but also the deposits of the
acquiring bank. Such an approach can greatly
overstate the amount of merger activity in a mar-
ket, especially in those cases in which a very
large bank acquires a very small bank.
Another problem is that some of the impact of
mergersonnewbankformationmaybecaptured
by the variables used to control for local banking
structure. Among the control variables are the
level of concentration, the deposit share of very
small banking organizations, and the deposit
share of complex banking organizations (com-
panies that operate in more than one state or
have multiple ownership layers). The problem is
that these variables measure banking structure
intheyearjustbeforeentry,whereasthemerger
variable measures merger activity during the
three years before entry. Thus, if mergers affect
entry by changing local banking structure, some
of the effect may be captured by the structure
variables rather than the merger variable.
10
Finally,likethefirststudy,thestudybyBerger
and others can be criticized for failing to show
that the conclusions on the relationship between
mergers and new bank formation are consistent
withresultsforspecificmergertypes.Theauthors
indicated they tried including additional infor-
mation on the type of merger and that this infor-
mation did not help explain the likelihood of
entry.
11 They interpreted this finding as confirm-
ing their main conclusion that mergers lead to
more new bank charters. Elsewhere in the study,
however, they noted that the main way mergers
can encourage start-ups is by reducing services
to small, relationship-based customers. They also
pointed out that the mergers most likely to have
this effect are those that produce large or com-
plex organizations. This argument suggests that
some mergers should have a greater tendency
than others to encourage start-ups. Thus, rather
that supporting their main conclusion, the find-
ingthatthetypeofmergerdoesnotmattercasts
some doubt on that conclusion.
IV.ARE MERGERS AND NEW
CHARTERS POSITIVELY
RELATED?
The two studies on new bank formation
released last year were the first to examine the
impact of mergers on start-ups in a rigorous
way. Taken together, however, the studies leave
importantquestionsunresolved.First,aremerg-
ersnegativelyrelatedtonewbankformation,as
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claimed by the second study? Second, is the
overall relationship between mergers and
start-ups consistent with the results for specific
types of mergers? This section provides new
evidence on the first question, while the follow-
ing section addresses the second question. The
main finding of this section is that new bank
charters were positively related to total merger
activity in the second half of the 1990s, the same
result obtained by Berger and others.
12
Measuring new bank formation and merger
activity
Like the two previous studies, this article uses
regression analysis to examine the relationship
between merger activity and new bank forma-
tion, controlling for other factors besides merg-
ers that might affect the incentive to start a bank.
The set of markets included and the period of
time covered are also similar to the previous
studiesurban markets during the period from
June 1995 to June 1999.
New bank formation is measured by the
amountofentryrelativetothesizeofthemarket.
If mergers influence the incentive to start a new
bank, then the volume of merger activity should
affect not only whether entry occurs, but also
how much entry occurs. Moreover, the amount
of entry should be measured relative to the size
of the market because, others things equal, larger
markets will tend to experience both greater entry
and higher levels of merger activity.
Two measures of entry are used: the number of
new banks chartered during each 12-month
period as a percent of the number of banking
organizations operating in the market at the
beginning of the period, and the amount of
equity capital at new banks chartered during the
period as a percent of total market deposits at the
beginning of the period.
13 The first measure
focuses on the number of start-ups, while the
second measure focuses on the total investment
in new banks. Both measures are used because
the effects of entry on such factors as competi-
tion and service are likely to depend on both
the number of new banks and the amount of
resources these banks start out with.
Merger activity is measured by the amount of
local deposits acquired in mergers as a percent
oftotaldepositsatthebeginningoftheperiod.
14
As in the study by Berger and others, mergers
are defined to include transactions in which the
acquired bank changes ownership but retains
its charter. In contrast to that study, however,
the merger measure does not include the depos-
its of the acquiring bank, which as noted earlier
can greatly overstate the amount of merger
activity in a market. Furthermore, intra-holding
company consolidations are excluded because
there is no obvious reason why such internal
reorganizations should affect either the degree
of competition in a market or the level of ser-
vice to small, relationship-based customers.
Mergers and new bank charters:
a preliminary look
Afirst step in establishing whether new bank
charters are positively related to prior merger
activity is to see if such a relationship exists
even without controlling for other factors affect-
ing the attractiveness of markets to banks. The
upper panel in Chart 2 shows how new bank
formation and merger activity are related when
new bank formation is measured by the ratio of
new bank equity to market deposits. The lower
panel shows the same relationship when new
bank formation is measured by the ratio of new
banks to the number of organizations.
For each urban market and each 12-month
period from June 1995 to June 1999, two num-
bers were calculatedthe rate of new bank
formation during the 12-month period and the
average volume of merger activity during the
previousthreeyears.The1,240observationson
markets and years are grouped into four catego-
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Chart 2
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MERGERS AND NEW BANKS
New bank equity as
percent of deposits
Average percent of deposits acquired in previous three years
Average percent of deposits acquired in previous three yearsries according to the level of prior merger activity.
At one extreme are the cases in which no depos-
its were acquired in mergers during the previous
threeyears,representedbythebaronthefar left.
At the other extreme are the cases in which the
averageproportionofdepositsacquiredinmerg-
ers exceeded 50 percent, represented by the bar
on the far right. For each group of observations,
the height of the bar shows the average rate of
new bank formation in the group. The number in
parentheses below each bar is the number of
observations in the group.
Chart 2 suggests a strong positive relationship
between the rate of new bank formation and
prior merger activity. In the upper panel, the
average ratio of new bank equity to market
deposits increases steadily with the amount of
prior merger activity, from a low of 0.02 percent
for the group with no prior merger activity to a
high of 0.08 percent for the group with very high
merger activity. As shown in the lower panel, an
equally strong relationship exists between merg-
ers and the alternative measure of new bank for-
mation, the ratio of new banks to the number of
organizations. That measure ranges from a low
of 0.5 percent in the group with no merger activ-
ity to a high of 3.5 percent in the group with very
high merger activity.
Mergers and new bank charters:
a closer look
The fact that new bank formation is positively
related to prior merger activity does not prove
that mergers were responsible for the surge in
new bank charters during the second half of the
1990s. Specifically, mergers and new bank
charters could be positively related only because
other factors made some markets more attractive
both to banking companies looking for acquisi-
tion targets and entrepreneurs interested in start-
ing new banks. As in the previous two studies,
multiple regression analysis was used to deter-
mine if start-ups were positively related to merg-
ersevenaftercontrollingfortheseotherfactors.
Twosetsofcontrolvariableswereincludedin
theregression.Thefirstsetcontrolfortheover-
all attractiveness of the market and are very
similar to those used in the other two studies.
These variables include population growth, per
capita income growth, and the average profit-
ability of small banksall measured over the
previous three years. The second set of vari-
ables control for aspects of local banking struc-
ture that could affect the incentive to start a
bank. These variables include the size of the
market, the deposit share of large banking orga-
nizations,andthedepositshareofdistantbanking
organizationsall measured as of three years
ago. These variables are similar to those used in
the previous two studies but differ in one key
waythey measure local banking structure
before mergers rather than after. Thus, in con-
trast to the other two studies, any tendency for
mergers to encourage or discourage entry by
changing local banking structure should be fully
captured by the merger variable.
The main results are shown in Table 3.
15
New bank formation is positively related to the
level of prior merger activity, even after con-
trolling for other influences on the rate of entry.
For each one-percentage-point increase in the
share of deposits acquired in mergers, the ratio
of new bank equity to total deposits increases
0.004 percentage point and the ratio of new
banks to total organizations increases 0.13 per-
centage point. Both effects are also statistically
significant, indicating that they are too large to
be attributed to chance.
16 Thus, whether the rela-
tionship between mergers and new bank charters
is considered in isolation, as in Chart 2, or after
controlling for other factors, as in Table 3, the
results support the view that a higher volume of
mergeractivityleadstoahigherrateofnewbank
formation.
V. DOES THE TYPE OF MERGER
MATTER?
The previous section provided evidence that
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merger activity. This section shows that the posi-
tive relationship between new bank formation
and total merger activity is consistent with the
results for specific types of mergers. In partic-
ular, new bank formation increases mainly in
response to mergers that shifted ownership away
from small organizations or toward distant orga-
nizationsthe same types of mergers that could
bereasonablyexpectedtoencouragestart-upsby
reducing services to small, relationship-based
customers.
New bank charters and mergers by type: a
preliminary look
As before, a useful first step in determining
whether the type of merger matters for new bank
formation is to see what kinds of relationship
exist when no effort is made to control for other
factors affecting entry. Chart 3 shows how the
rate of new bank formation is related to two
broad categories of prior merger activity. The
first category includes those mergers in which
ownership shifts away from a small organization
or toward a more distant organization. The sec-
ond category consists of all remaining merg-
ersfor example, mergers in which ownership
remains with a small or locally based banking
organization. In both cases, new bank forma-
tionismeasuredbytheratioofnewbankequity
to market deposits.
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Consistent with the view that mergers spur
new entry by reducing service to small, rela-
tionship-based customers, only the first merger
category shows a clear positive relationship to
the rate of new bank formation. As shown in
the upper panel of the chart, the ratio of new
bank equity to market deposits increases
steadily with the importance of the first type of
merger. When no mergers of the first type
occurred, the average ratio of new bank equity
to market deposits was only 0.03 percent. In
contrast, when more than half of local deposits
were acquired through mergers of the first type,
the ratio of new bank equity to market deposits
was 0.15 percent. As shown in the lower half of
the chart, no such relationship exists between
the rate of new bank formation and the second
merger category. The rate of new bank forma-
tion varies within a narrow range and is only
slightly higher in the group with the most
merger activity than in the group with the least
merger activity.
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Table 3
ESTIMATED EFFECT OF MERGERS ON NEW BANK FORMATION
Urban markets, June 1995 to June 1999
Measure of new bank formation
Measure of merger activity
New bank equity as percent of
total deposits
New banks as percent of number
of organizations
Percent of deposits acquired
in mergers .004*** .13***
*** Significant at 1 percent level.
Note: Regressions were estimated by the Tobit method. Complete results are reported in the appendix.ECONOMIC REVIEW l FIRST QUARTER 2000 33
Chart 3
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MERGERS AND NEW BANKS
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closer look
While suggestive, Chart 3 has two limitations.
First, because the chart does not control for the
attractiveness and structure of banking markets,
the positive relationship between new bank forma-
tion and the first merger category could be coin-
cidental.Second,thechartdoesnotrevealwhich
mergers in the first category have the greater
effect on subsequent entrythose in which own-
ership shifts away from small organizations or
those in which ownership shifts toward distant
organizations.
To overcome these limitations, the model in
the previous section was reestimated using the
same variables to control for the attractiveness
andstructureofthelocalbankingmarketbutdis-
tinguishing among four different types of merg-
ers. The different merger types were 1) mergers
involvingashiftinownershipfromasmallorga-
nizationtoamedium-sizeorganization,2)merg-
ers involving a shift in ownership from a small
organization to a large organization, 3) mergers
falling in neither of the first two categories but
involving a shift in ownership to an organization
in another market or state, and 4) all other merg-
ers. As before, two equations were estimated
one for the ratio of new bank equity to total
deposits and one for the ratio of new banks to the
number of organizations. The results are reported
in Table 4.
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The results indicate that the rate of new bank
formationisstronglyrelatedtomergersthatshift
ownership away from small organizations or
toward distant organizations, and is only weakly
related to other mergers. Each of the first three
merger types has a positive and statistically sig-
nificanteffectontherateofnewbankformation,
whether that rate is measured by the ratio of new
bank equity to total deposits or the ratio of new
banks to the total number of organizations. In
contrast, the fourth merger type has no apprecia-
ble effect on the ratio of new bank equity to
deposits and only a marginally significant
effect on the ratio of new banks to organiza-
tions. The effects of the first three types of
merger on new bank formation are not only
much bigger than the effects of the last type of
merger,butalsostatisticallydifferentinfiveout
of the six cases (appendix). Thus, the differ-
encesshowninTable4aretoolargetobeattrib-
uted to chance.
The results also show that the mergers with
the strongest relationship to new bank forma-
tion are those in which ownership shifts from a
small organization to a large one. For each per-
centage-point increase in deposits acquired
through such mergers, the ratio of new bank
equity to total deposits increases 0.012 percent-
agepoint,andtheratioofnewbankstothetotal
number of organizations increases 0.34 per-
centage point. These effects are not only many
times larger than for the last merger category,
but also twice as large as for the other two types
of mergers with the potential to reduce service
to customersmergers that shift ownership
from small to medium-size organizations and
mergers that do not shift ownership away from
small organizations but do shift ownership
toward distant organizations.
There are two possible explanations for the
findingthatentryrespondsmosttomergersthat
shift ownership from a small organization to a
large one. The first explanation is that large
organizations are less inclined to cater to small,
relationship-based customers than medium-
size organizations, and much less inclined to
cater to such customers than small organiza-
tions.Thesecondexplanationisthatacquisitions
of small organizations by large organizations
have an especially large effect because, in the
vast majority of such mergers, the acquiring
organizationisnotonlylargebutalsobasedina
different market or state.
19
While having the biggest bang per buck,
mergers that shifted ownership from small orga-
34 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYnizationstolargeorganizationswerenottheones
with the greatest total effect on entry during the
sample period. That distinction goes to the third
merger categorymergers that did not shift own-
ership away from small organizations but did
shift ownership to distant organizations. On aver-
age, over three times as great a percentage of
localdepositswereacquiredthroughthesemergers
as through small-to-large mergers, more than
making up for the fact that each percentage point
ofdepositsacquiredhadasmallereffectonentry.
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The results by type of merger have two impor-
tant implications. First, the results lend greater
credibility to the finding in this article and the
study by Berger and others that new bank forma-
tion is positively related to total merger activity.
New bank charters turn out to be closely related
only to those mergers that shift ownership away
from small organizations or toward distant orga-
nizations. The fact that these mergers can create
gaps in service to small businesses and other
customerswithastrongpreferenceforpersonal
contact makes it more plausible that new bank
formation and total merger activity would be
positively related. Second, the results suggest
thatnewbankformationmayoffsetsomeofthe
harmful effects of mergers, making it more likely
that banking consolidation is beneficial on bal-
ance. Specifically, the fact that entry increases in
response to mergers that shift ownership away
from small organizations or toward distant orga-
nizationsmeansthatanygapsinservicecreated
by these mergers will be filled more quickly.
VI.CONCLUSIONS
The number of new bank charters increased
sharply in the second half of the 1990s follow-
ing a prolonged decline. This surge in new
banks coincided with a record volume of bank
mergers, leading many banking analysts to
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Table 4
ESTIMATED EFFECT OF MERGERS ON NEW BANK FORMATION,
BY TYPE OF MERGER
Urban markets, June 1995 to June 1999
Measure of new bank formation
Percent of deposits acquired
by type of merger
New bank equity as
percent of total deposits
New banks as percent of
number of organizations
Shift from small to medium-size
organization
.005** .19***
Shift from small to large organization .012*** .34***
Neither of above but shift to distant
organization
.005*** .16***
All other .001 .06*
* Significant at 10 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
***Significant at 1 percent level.
Note: A small organization is one with less than $1 billion in assets, a medium-size organization is one with $1 billion to
$10 billion in assets, and a large organization is one with more than $10 billion in assets (1998 dollars). Shifts toward dis-
tant organizations are shifts from in-market organizations to out-of-market organizations or from in-state organizations to
out-of-state organizations. Regressions were estimated by the Tobit method. Complete results are reported in the appendix.claim that mergers had encouraged the start-ups
byreducingservicetosmallbusinessesandother
bank customers. This view was not seriously
questioned until early last year, when a study of
mergers and new bank charters in the 1990s con-
cludedthatmergershadactuallydiscouragedthe
formation of new banks. Adding to the confu-
sion, another study soon appeared that came to
the opposite conclusion, finding that mergers
had led to more new banks during the 1990s.
Likethesecondstudy,theevidenceinthisarti-
cle supports the popular view that mergers lead
to more new banks. Taking a new look at the
data, the article finds that total merger activity
andnewbankformationwerepositivelyrelated
in the 1990s. Distinguishing among different
types of mergers, the article then shows that
new bank formation was closely related only to
thosemergersthatinvolvedashiftinownership
away from small organizations or toward dis-
tant organizations. This finding not only provides
a plausible explanation for the link between
new bank charters and total merger activity, but
also offers hope that any harmful effects of
bankmergersonbankcustomerswillbeatleast
partly offset by new banks stepping in to fill
gaps in service.
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APPENDIX
This appendix provides the full regres-
sion results and explains the variables used
to control for the attractiveness and struc-
ture of local banking markets. The results
on total merger activity are reported in
Table A1, while the results on mergers by
type are reported in Table A2. The control
variables are the same in each table and are
explained below.
The first three variables control for the
overall attractiveness of local markets to
new banks. Average growth in population
and per capita income during the three pre-
vious calendar years are included because
new banks can attract customers more easily
infast-growingmarketsthanslow-growing
markets. Average profitability during the
three previous calendar years is included
because high profits may be a sign that the
marketisunderservedorthatexistingbanks
are overcharging for services. Measuring
local profitability has become increasingly
difficultbecauseprofitsarereportedonlyat
the bank level and many banks now do
business in more than one market. Data on
local profits can also be distorted by large
holding companies shifting assets and lia-
bilities among banks in different states to
take advantage of differences in local tax
rates. Accordingly, average profitability is
measured by the average return on assets
(ROA) at all banks with less than $1 billion
in assets and at least 80 percent of their
depositsinthemarket. Insomemarkets,no
banks met this criterion, making it impossi-
ble to compute average ROA. A dummy
variable was included for these markets to
avoidexcludingthemfromtheregressions.
The next set of variables control for dif-
ferent aspects of local banking structure that
could affect entry, all measured as of three
years ago so that they do not reflect the
impact of recent mergers. Concentration is
included to allow for the possibility that dom-
inant firms engage in entry-deterring behavior.
This variable is measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index for local bank deposits,
expressed as a percentage of its maximum
value of 10,000. Even in the absence of
mergers,marketsdominatedbylargeordistant
organizations could experience high rates of
entry because these organizations fail to meet
the needs of small, relationship-based cus-
tomers. To capture this possibility, the regres-
sions include the deposit shares of four types
of banking organizationthose with $1 bil-
lion to $10 billion in total assets, those with
more than $10 billion in assets, those based
in a different market but the same state, and
those based in a different state.
The final control variable is the size of the
market.Thedependentvariableineachregres-
sion was calculated by dividing a measure of
new bank formation by a measure of market
size. Specifically, the number of new bank
charters was divided by the total number of
organizations, and the amount of new bank
equity was divided by total deposits. New
bank formation need not increase propor-
tionately with the size of the market, how-
ever. Accordingly, the regressions allow the
rate of new bank formation to differ among
three size categories of marketsthose with
lessthan$1billionindeposits,thosewith$1
billion to $10 billion in deposits, and those
with more than $10 billion in deposits.38 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Table A1
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR RATE OF NEW BANK FORMATION
IN URBAN MARKETS
June 1995 to June 1999
Dependent variable
Independent variable
New bank equity
as percent of total deposits
New banks as percent
of number of organizations
Population growth .024*** .90***
Growth in per capita income .015*** .63***
Average profitability -.019 -.62
Market concentration -.008*** -.21***
Deposit share of larger organizations
Medium ($1b to $10b) .001 .04
Large (>$10b) .003*** .13***
Deposit shares of out-of-market organizations
In-state -.001 -.04
Out-of-state .000 -.01
Market size
Medium ($1b to $10b) .052 2.52*
Large (>$10b) .162** 6.69***
Deposits acquired in mergers .004*** .13***
Memo:
Number of observations 1,240 1,240
Number with nonzero
dependent variable 290 290
* Significant at 10 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
*** Significant at 1 percent level.
Note:EquationswereestimatedbytheTobitmethod.Allvariablesexceptmarketsizearepercentages.Populationgrowth,
income growth, average profitability, and deposits acquired in mergers are averages for the three previous years. Concen-
tration, deposit shares, and market size are for three years ago.ECONOMIC REVIEW l FIRST QUARTER 2000 39
Table A2
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR RATE OF NEW BANK FORMATION
IN URBAN MARKETS
By type of merger
Dependent variable
Independent variable
New bank equity
as percent of total deposits
New banks as percent
of number of organizations
Population growth .022*** .85***
Growth in per capita income .012** .56**
Average profitability -.013 -.45
Market concentration -.009*** -.24***
Deposit share of larger organizations
Medium ($1b to $10b) .002* .08**
Large (>$10b) .004** .16***
Deposit shares of out-of-market organizations
In-state -.001 -.03
Out-of-state .001 -.00
Market size
Medium ($1b to $10b) .045 2.35*
Large (>$10b) .143** 6.20***
Deposits acquired in mergers, by type
1) Shift from small to
medium-size organization .005** .19***
2) Shift from small to
large organization .012*** .34***
3) Neither of above but shift
to distant organization .005*** .16***
4) All other .001 .06*
Memo:
Difference between merger coefficients
1) minus 4) .004 .14*
2) minus 4) .011*** .28***
3) minus 4) .004** .10**
* Significant at 10 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
*** Significant at 1 percent level.
Note:EquationswereestimatedbytheTobitmethod.Allvariablesexceptmarketsizearepercentages.Populationgrowth,
income growth, average profitability, and deposits acquired in mergers are averages for the three previous years. Concen-
tration, deposit shares, and market size are for three years ago.ENDNOTES
1 Some studies of other industries have also found evidence
that high concentration discourages entry (Orr).
2 Regulators typically measure local market concentration
by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). This index is the
sumofthesquaredpercentagedepositsharesofallorganiza-
tions competing in a market, with thrifts typically assigned a
weight of 50 percent. The HHI can take on values between
zero and 10,000, with higher values representing higher lev-
els of concentration. In the past, regulators have usually
either disapproved mergers that raised the HHI above 1,800
or required the merging organizations to divest enough
branches to keep the index below that threshold.
3 This argument has a long history, references to which can
be found in Keeton. For a recent statement of the argument,
see Berger and Udell.
4 The empirical evidence on the effect of mergers on small
business lending is mixed. Some studies have found evi-
dence that small business lending is reduced by acquisitions
ofsmallorganizationsbylargeorganizationsorlocalorgani-
zations by distant organizations, while other studies have
not.Forsurveysofthesestudies,seeBoardofGovernorsand
Berger and Udell.
5 For example, Berger and Udell argue that large organiza-
tions may avoid providing relationship-based services
because they have a comparative advantage in providing
transactions-based services and it is not efficient to provide
both kind of services. This argument suggests that large
organizations should not only be less interested in making
small business loans than other organizations, but also less
interested in providing personalized service to depositors.
The idea that banking organizations specialize in different
types of services is related to the theory of strategic
groups. According to this theory, most industries are not
homogeneous but are composed of two or more groups of
firms, each following a different business strategy. For evi-
dence that the banking industry fits this description, see
Amel and Rhoades.
6 Following the usual convention, this article refers to one
variable as having a positive (negative) effect on another
only if the estimated coefficient is both positive (negative)
and statistically significant. Roughly speaking, a variable is
statistically significant if it is too large to be attributed to
chance. In Seelig and Critchfield, the estimated coefficients
on other types of mergers (in-market mergers and mergers
between banks in the same holding company) are also nega-
tive, but they are not statistically significant.
7 An out-of-market merger will increase local market con-
centration only if the acquiring bank already has branches in
the market.
8 There are other differences between the two studies
which do not seem as important but might also account for
the difference in results. Most of these differences have to
do with the set of variables used to control for the overall
attractiveness of the market and local banking structure.
9 While the estimated coefficients were of similar magni-
tude in the two periods, statistical significance was some-
whatlowerinthe1995-98periodduetothesmallernumber
of observations.
10 To take an extreme example, suppose that the only way
mergersaffectedentrywasbyincreasingconcentrationand
that entry was inversely related to concentration at the start
of the year. Then including concentration at the start of the
yearasacontrolvariablewouldresultinanestimatedcoef-
ficient on the merger variable close to zerothe merger
variable would not add any information beyond what was
already contained in the concentration variable.
11 The types of merger considered are those involving
banksoperatinginthesamemarket,thoseresultinginorga-
nizations under $100 million in size, and those involving
banks in the same holding company.
12 In those key areas in which the second study improved
upon the first, this article follows the second study. The
article also tries to improve upon the second study, how-
ever, by refining the measures of new bank formation and
merger activity and using a somewhat different set of con-
trol variables.
13 As in the other two studies, several types of newly char-
teredbanksareexcludedbanksformedtotakeoverfailed
institutions, banks specializing in trust activities or
creditcardlending,andbanksbelongingtolargeholding
companies.
14 In those mergers in which two or more organizations
combine to form a new organization, rather than one orga-
nizationformallyacquiringtheothers,thelargestorganiza-
tion is treated as the acquirer and the other organizations as
the acquirees.
15 The full results are reported in the appendix. The impact
of the control variables on entry was as expected, with a
couple of important exceptions. Specifically, entry tended
tobehigherinlargemarkets,marketswithrapidpopulation
and income growth, markets with low levels of concentra-
tion, and markets with high deposit shares of large banking
organizations. Contrary to expectations, entry did not depend
on average bank profitability or on the deposit shares of
40 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYout-of-state or out-of-market banking organizations.
16 The reason merger activity causes a much smaller change
in the ratio of new bank equity to market deposits than in the
ratio of new banks to total organizations is that the average
equityofnewbanksismuchsmallerthantheaveragemarket
deposits of existing organizations$6 million versus $270
million.
17 Although not shown in the chart, the results are similar
when new bank formation is measured by the ratio of new
banks to the number of organizations.
18 The coefficients on the control variables were little
changed and are reported in the appendix.
19 In the sample, over 90 percent of the merger activity
involving a shift in ownership from a small organization to
a large organization also involved a shift in ownership to a
distant organization. A formal statistical test could not
reject the hypothesis that the small-to-large mergers that
did not involve shift to a distant organization had the same
effect on entry as the small-to-large mergers that did
involve such a shift. This test is not very reliable, however,
because there were so few small-to-large mergers that did
not involve a shift to a distant organization.
20 In the sample, the average percent of deposits acquired
in previous mergers was 2.2 for the first category, 1.7 for
the second category, 6.0 for the third category, and 8.2 for
the fourth category.
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